Algorithmic complexity of solution concepts in selected classes of non-cooperative games by Wichera, Adam
Title: Algorithmic complexity of solution concepts in selected classes of non-cooperative games
Author: Adam Wichera
Department: Department of Logic
Supervisor: RNDr. Ondřej Majer, CSc.
Supervisor’s e-mail address: majer@u.cas.cz
Abstract In the presented work we study natural algorthmic problems rising from the concept
of Nash Equilibrium. The problem of it’s existence is trivial, because it follows from Nash The-
orem of completeness of Nash Equilibria. Even related search problem doesn’t seem to belong
to NP-complete class, the reason being the very fact, that existence of Nash Equilibria is certain.
Interesting observation is that every natural extension of this problem seems to be NP-complete.
Many of such problems have been proven to be NP-complete through reduction of SAT problem,
Klike problem or problem of searching subcover of certain size. The question, wheather the pro-
blem of existence of assymmetric Nash equilibria of symmeric game ts with the others, in being
NP-complete, has been an open problem. Here we show how to alternate the proof from [? ] and
apply the construction to problem of existence of assymetric equilibria and therefore prove its
NP-completness.
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